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NETWORKS LIABLE FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT?
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ABSTRACT
In June 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the decision in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd., a case that asked
whether peer-to-peer networks may be held liable for facilitating
the illegal distribution of music over the internet. The music
industry petitioned the Supreme Court to settle the disagreement
between the circuit courts over the standard of liability for aiding
in copyright infringement. The case was based on a clash between
the protection of technological innovation and the protection of
artistic works. This iBrief examines the circuit split and the
Grokster opinion and discusses the questions of liability left
unresolved by the Supreme Court. It argues that further
clarification of the Sony rule is still needed in order to encourage
the proliferation of legitimate peer-to-peer networks by protecting
their services while discouraging illegitimate file-sharing activities.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Last spring, the war to curb illegal file-sharing (over eighty-five
million copyrighted songs a day) entered a new battleground, this time
before the Supreme Court. 2 On December 10, 2004, the Court agreed to
hear Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd. 3 This case marked the
second time the Court has visited the issue of the secondary liability of a
technology manufacturer for copyright infringement; the first decision
having been made over twenty years ago. 4 The current dispute centered on
whether providers of peer-to-peer networks, who allow the illegal
distribution of copyrighted songs and other media over the internet, are
1
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liable for the copyright infringement their services enable. 5 Finding that the
defendants had no actual or constructive knowledge of infringement, the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the service providers
were not liable for aiding in illegal copyright infringement. 6
¶2
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the split
between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits over the standard of liability for
aiding in copyright infringement. The split evolved from differing
interpretations of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, also known as the
Betamax case, which has been a guidepost on copyright law to federal
courts for the past two decades. 7 In Betamax, the Court found the
manufacturers of video recorders were not liable for the copyright
infringement committed by the user of such equipment. 8 The Court
determined that “the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” 9 Pronouncing
that the “question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially
significant noninfringing uses,” the Court determined that, on the basis of
facts presented concerning the actual use of the machine, there were
substantial noninfringing uses and thus no liability. 10
¶3
Over the years, the Betamax doctrine has guided lower courts in
assessing the potential liability of technology providers for contributory
copyright infringement. 11 Yet, as rapidly advancing technology gave rise to
novel questions in copyright law, the circuits began to diverge in their
interpretation and application of Betamax. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit
considered the issue of contributory copyright infringement and affirmed
Napster’s liability for facilitating the transmission of copyrighted music

5
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among its users. 12 The Ninth Circuit found that the Betamax “substantial
noninfringing use” test applied to constructive knowledge, or whether the
defendant should have known or had imputed knowledge due to the
circumstances, and it was not a bar to liability if it could still be shown that
the defendant “knew or had reason to know of its users’ infringement of
plaintiff’s copyrights.” 13 The court determined that if a system operator
“learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to
purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes
to direct infringement.” 14 The court imposed liability for vicarious
infringement because Napster had the ability to control the infringement and
benefited financially from it. 15
¶4
In 2003, the Seventh Circuit introduced a different interpretation of
Betamax, affirming the decision to shut down the Aimster internet service,
which facilitated the sharing of music files over the internet. The court
cited Aimster’s failure to demonstrate any “probable” noninfringing uses of
the service as imputing knowledge of infringement and evidence of its
liability. 16 The court insisted that even when noninfringing uses of a
product exist, a service provider must still attempt preventing infringement
or “show that it would have been disproportionately costly” to do so. 17

This iBrief compares the decisions of the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits in the Napster and Aimster cases and their differing interpretations
of the Betamax “noninfringing use” standard. This iBrief focuses on the
Grokster case and whether the Supreme Court’s opinion appropriately
resolves the conflict between the Circuits and provides a rule to resolve the
tension between artists and innovators. It concludes that while the Supreme
Court has ruled in a way that prevents technology providers from
intentionally avoiding liability by changing the form but not the substance
or function of their services, the liability of providers remains unclear.
¶5

I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT
A. Secondary Liability and the Common Law
¶6
The various standards used to evaluate the liability of peer-to-peer
services are all rooted in common, rather than statutory law. The concept of
secondary liability for copyright infringement, which holds a second party
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liable for the direct infringement of others, has emerged from the common
law tort doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability. 18 Contributory
liability requires the tortfeasor to possess knowledge of the infringing act
and to participate in the causation of, inducement or material involvement
of the act. 19 Vicarious liability requires the actor to profit from the direct
infringement of others while possessing the right and ability to control the
infringing act. 20
¶7
As will be discussed below, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have
based liability on different interpretations of these common law doctrines
due to the gaps left by the Betamax case. These differences remain
significant because the Supreme Court in Grokster did not harmonize the
different interpretations of contributory and vicarious liability, but rather
introduced a new “inducement theory” of secondary liability. 21

B. The Betamax Case
¶8
In 1984, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the issue of
secondary liability for copyright infringement in the Betamax case.
Expressing reluctance to expand copyright protections without explicit
legislative guidance, the Court construed the Copyright Act in light of its
ultimate purpose, “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.” 22

Betamax recognized the existence of liability for contributory
copyright infringement after finding that a parallel theory of liability exists
for the Patent Act. 23 However, the Court warned that a business that
supplies copying equipment “should not be stifled simply because the
equipment is used by some individuals to make unauthorized
reproductions” of another’s work. 24

¶9

¶10
Consequently, the Court was careful not to create too broad a theory
of liability, as imposing contributory liability upon providers inhibits
innovation because “every article of commerce may be used for unlawful
activities.” 25 Holding manufacturers liable for products that could be used
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for infringing purposes would eliminate many socially-valuable products
from the market because these products would become more expensive as
manufacturers accounted for the costs of such liability. 26 Additionally,
suppliers have no absolute knowledge of how their products will be used by
consumers, nor do they have control over these uses. 27 Nevertheless, if
there are no commercially significant noninfringing uses of a product, then
the supplier has notice and is liable for contributory infringement. 28
¶11
Because Betamax is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,”
such as time-shifting, tape-recording a program in order to view it later, 29
the Court held the suppliers were not liable for contributory infringement. 30
Yet, in its concluding words, the Court again cautioned that it was not the
Court’s “job to apply laws that have not yet been written” and invited
Congress to take a second look at the new technology if a different result
was more desirable. 31

C. The Ninth Circuit’s Napster Decision
¶12
Napster, Inc. developed software that allowed users to share files,
mostly of copyrighted music, by making music files stored on one
member’s computer available for copying by other users. 32 Napster’s
software facilitated the search for music stored on other computers and
transferred exact copies of files once they were located. 33 When users
connected to the Napster service, the names of their music files were
uploaded from their computers to the Napster servers, creating a directory
of all files available for transfer to other users. 34 Hence, when a user
searched for a file, the Napster servers communicated the location of the
music file to the user conducting the search, and the requesting computer
used it to establish a connection and download a copy of the music from the
source computer. 35 The plaintiffs, A&M Records, who legally record,
distribute and sell copyrighted music, sued Napster in California District
Court and obtained a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from
engaging or aiding others in the copying and distribution of illegal music. 36

26
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that liability was based on
whether Napster, “with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.” 37
Thus, the court limited the application of Betamax to circumstances where
the defendant is found to have possessed constructive knowledge of
infringement. Betamax, therefore, does not impose the requisite level of
knowledge where the product is “capable of both infringing and ‘substantial
noninfringing uses.’” 38 The Ninth Circuit focused on whether the product
is “capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses,” and placed less
emphasis on the current proportion of infringing uses. 39
¶13

The Ninth Circuit concluded that knowledge of the existence of
infringing material, control over access to it, and a failure to remove the
infringing material constitutes contributory infringement when the
defendant supplies the services that enable the infringement. 40 The
conclusion that Napster could have but chose not to end the copyright
infringement occurring on its network led to the court’s finding of
contributory negligence. 41 The Ninth Circuit also imposed vicarious
liability upon a finding that Napster did have the ability to control its
system, and it received a financial benefit because the infringing material
was a “draw” for users. 42
¶14

The problem left by Napster is not that the decision achieved the
wrong result, but that the court based liability on notice and capacity to
control, thus raising a question as to how the Ninth Circuit doctrine would
apply to a service provider who slightly altered their infrastructure to
eliminate their control to escape. 43 This ambiguous precedent contributed
to the Ninth Circuit’s later problematic ruling in the Grokster case.
¶15

D. The Seventh Circuit’s Aimster Decision
¶16
The Aimster service facilitated file swapping over the internet
through software that, like Napster’s software, could be downloaded free of
charge and enabled users to communicate with all Aimster users, or only
with listed “buddies,” in order to exchange files. 44 In responding to a user’s
37

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d., 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
38
Id. at 1020 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984)).
39
Id. at 1021 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-43) (distinguishing between
“current uses” and “capable” uses).
40
Id. at 1022.
41
Id.
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search request, Aimster’s software would search all users’ shared files,
which, like Napster, remained on users’ computers, and would instruct the
source computer to send the requested file to the recipient to download. 45
For a small fee, Aimster users could download the most shared music files
more easily than was possible using the free service. 46 The plaintiffs, who
were recording industry owners of copyrighted music, sued Aimster in the
United States District court for the Northern District of Illinois and were
granted a preliminary injunction to stop Aimster from aiding in copyright
infringement. 47
¶17
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Richard
Posner, added a few new twists to the Betamax doctrine. 48 Pointing to
overwhelming actual examples of copyright infringement, the court
switched the burden of production to the defendant to show substantial
noninfringing uses of its service and found Aimster liable for contributory
infringement when it failed to demonstrate such uses. 49 Judge Posner
acknowledged that several noninfringing uses were possible, but “the
question is how probable they are.” 50 In other words, “[i]t is not enough . . .
that a product or service be physically capable . . . of a noninfringing use,”
rather, there must be evidence that the service “is actually used for the
stated non-infringing purposes.” 51 Even when such uses are present, the
court found that “if the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability
as a contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it
would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least
reduce substantially the infringing uses.” 52 The court noted that providers
cannot avoid liability by taking reasonable care to change the architecture of
their system to provide encryption features because “willful blindness is
knowledge,” and Aimster’s deliberate encryption of files to prevent its
knowing what copyrighted files were being exchanged is not a defense. 53
¶18
Concerning the knowledge element of contributory liability, the
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that “actual
45
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46
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knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a
facilitator a contributory infringer” without examining the proportion of
such uses and asserted that such a blanket rule might eliminate socially
desirable products. 54 As the Supreme Court had suggested in Betamax,
such a rule is dangerous because many products could be used for illegal
purposes.

II. THE GROKSTER CASE
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Grokster Decision
1. Architecture of the Grokster Network and Streamcast
¶19
The Ninth Circuit found that Grokster and StreamCast were not
liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. 55 Grokster
and StreamCast freely distributed software that, like Napster and Aimster,
allowed users to share computer files. 56 However, the architectures of the
defendants’ peer-to-peer networks had important differences from Napster
and Aimster, both of which maintained centralized indexes of files and
control over them. 57 Both StreamCast and Grokster created decentralized
networks to reduce their control over files exchanged using their software. 58
The StreamCast network used a decentralized index, meaning that the index
of available files remained on the individual computer’s networks and the
software conducted a search request of each index. 59 Grokster also uses a
decentralized network with a “supernode” model that provides that select
computers in the network are used as indexing servers, and the software
provides that search requests are connected to an accessible supernode that
then provides the results. 60 Grokster and StreamCast therefore remained
unaware of the particular files copied using their software, yet discovery
revealed that ninety percent of the available files were copyrighted works. 61
2. Applying the Precedent for Liability Set by Napster
¶20
The Ninth Circuit echoed its initial statements in Napster by
pronouncing that in order to find the defendants liable for contributory
copyright infringement, they must have knowledge of the infringement and
54

Id. at 649 (stating that defendants in Sony did have actual knowledge of
infringing activities, and the Ninth Circuit erred in applying Sony only to the
constructive knowledge element of contributory infringement).
55
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004).
56
Id. at 1158.
57
Id. at 1159.
58
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2771 (2005).
59
Id.
60
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61
Id. at 2772.
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have made a material contribution to the infringement. 62 Applying the
Napster precedent, the Ninth Circuit explained:
If the product at issue is not capable of substantial or commercially
significant noninfringing uses, then the copyright owner need only
show that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the
infringement. On the other hand, if the product at issue is capable of
substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses, then the
copyright owner must demonstrate that the defendant had reasonable
knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to act on that
knowledge to prevent infringement. 63

This standard is at odds with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling that the
product must actually be used for substantial noninfringing uses to avoid
imputing constructive knowledge to the supplier. The Ninth Circuit
declined to follow the Seventh Circuit’s narrower interpretation of the
Betamax doctrine and found that since many capable substantial
noninfringing uses were shown, the Betamax safe harbor doctrine applied. 64
Observing that the Grokster software was indeed “capable of substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses,” the court determined that the
only way left to find the defendants liable was to show that they had
“reasonable knowledge of specific infringement.” 65
¶21

¶22
The Ninth Circuit found that due to the decentralized nature of
Grokster’s architecture, any attempt to give the defendants notice to satisfy
the “reasonable knowledge” requirement would be “irrelevant” because the
notice would arrive at a time when the defendants “do nothing to facilitate,
and cannot do anything to stop” the infringement. 66 The court distinguished
Grokster from Napster because, while both networks were found capable of
noninfringing uses, the software design was different. 67 Napster’s service
employed a centralized set of servers that contained an index list of
available files, whereas Grokster and StreamCast used decentralized
networks and maintained neither central indexes nor control over index
files. 68 If the defendants “closed their doors and deactivated all computers

62

Grokster, 380 F.3d. at 1160.
Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
64
Id. at 1162, n.9 (concluding that the Seventh Circuit analysis was flawed
because it thought a finding of substantial noninfringing uses in the Seventh
Circuit would prevent a finding of contributory infringement, regardless of the
defendant’s level of knowledge).
65
Id. at 1162.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1163.
68
Id.
63
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within their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with
little or no interruption.” 69
¶23
The Ninth Circuit also found the defendants made no material
contribution to the infringement. It observed that unlike the defendants in
Napster, the defendants in Grokster did not possess files, or lists of files, to
delete, nor could they control access to their networks, and thus they did not
provide the “sites and facilities” to contribute to direct infringement. 70

3. Problems with the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of Betamax
¶24
The Ninth Circuit found the fact that the defendants could have
altered their technology to maintain control and limit infringement
irrelevant. 71 Applying the circuit precedent, the court found the defendants
not liable due to the architecture of their decentralized systems. The most
alarming feature of this result is that “both a party’s level of knowledge of
and its right and ability to control infringing activity,” the factors that the
Ninth Circuit found the Grokster defendants lacked, “are a function of the
design of its technology, and of how [a software provider] has defined its
legal relationship with end users” 72 and therefore can easily be manipulated
by the software providers to avoid liability. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis
also would not encounter the problems the Ninth Circuit faced in finding
that the defendants had control over their networks. The Seventh Circuit’s
approach considers “how the defendant designed the technology and
whether it could have made (and could still make) design changes to
eliminate or decrease direct infringement.” 73

B. The Supreme Court’s Decision: The Inducement Theory
¶25
Faced with the task of clarifying the doctrines of contributory and
vicarious liability and whether the substantial noninfringing uses must be
probable or just capable, the Supreme Court evaded the issue by applying

69

Id. (citing MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.Supp. 2d 1029, 1041
(C.D. Cal. 2003)).
70
Id.
71
See Brief by Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Issuance of Writ of
Certiorari at 11, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005)
(No. 04-480) [hereinafter “Professors’ Brief”] (“The Ninth Circuit . . . views the
[Grokster] technology as static—fixed in time and in design”). See also MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 73
U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480).
72
Professors’ Brief at 15.
73
Id. at 11.
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another patent liability rule, the “inducement theory” of liability, in the
copyright context. 74
The Court recognized that the Betamax safe harbor only applied to
cases of “constructive knowledge.” Further, the Court found the Betamax
safe harbor barred a finding of secondary liability based on presuming
knowledge and intent to cause infringement solely from the design of a
product that is capable of substantial lawful uses, even if the distributor has
actual knowledge that the product is used for infringement. 75 However, the
Court clarified that when a product is capable of substantial noninfringing
uses, this doctrine does not prevent a finding of contributory liability “when
an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent
of design and distribution of the product.” 76
¶26

¶27
Similar to inducement in the patent context, the Court pronounced
that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement
by third parties.” 77 “[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual
infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to
liability.” 78 This theory of liability was based on “purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate
commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.” 79
¶28
The Supreme Court observed that the record was replete with
evidence demonstrating inducing messages sent to users. StreamCast
targeted former Napster users to use its programs and advertisements, and
internal communications revealed its unlawful purpose. 80 Grokster also
targeted former Napster users and even used metatages to attract users
searching for Napster to its website. 81 The Court also noted that neither
defendant attempted to filter files or reduce infringing activity and that both
profited from the high-volume of infringing uses. 82 In sum, the Court found

74

MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-79 (2005)
(warning that the Ninth Circuit had adopted an overly broad view of the
Betamax doctrine, and that the Betamax safe harbor only applied to “imputed
intent”).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 2778.
77
Id. at 2780.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 2781 (finding evidence that defendant’s purposes were communicated to
the public irrelevant because the purpose was unlawful).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 2781-82.

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 22

“[t]he unlawful objective is unmistakable” and the defendants were not
protected from liability. 83

III. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS AFTER GROKSTER
A. The Unresolved Circuit Split
¶29
While the Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit erred in its
broad application of the Sony safe harbor, the Court declined to clarify the
Sony rule. 84 The Supreme Court did affirm that the Sony rule only applies
in determining liability based upon “constructive knowledge.” 85 Yet,
whether to avoid a finding of constructive knowledge a defendant must
demonstrate that its product is capable of substantial noninfringing uses, as
the Ninth Circuit found, or that substantial noninfringing uses are probable,
as the Seventh Circuit found, has not been resolved. The Court left “further
consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required” 86 and
noted that Sony did not clarify “‘the question of how much [actual or
potential] use is commercially significant.’” 87 Instead, the Court found that
insufficient evidence was presented to show that there was a “reasonable
prospect that substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses
were likely to develop over time.” 88

B. Existing Problems
¶30
Another opportunity to clarify the Betamax rule may be
approaching the Court faster than it wishes. While the inducement rule
resolves the problem of distributors who attempt to “turn a blind eye” by
altering the structure of their systems to decrease control yet still actively
encourage and rely on infringement to profit, it does not clarify liability
rules in the situation where inducement is absent. Several problems arise
from this ambiguity.
¶31
First, since proving active inducement is enough for liability,
copyright litigation will become much more complicated and costly due to
more in depth discovery by plaintiffs (including emails, internal documents,

83

Id. at 2782 (remanding the case for reconsideration of MGM’s motion for
summary judgment).
84
Id. at 2779.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 2779.
87
Id. at 2784 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 464 (1984)).
88
Id. at 2786 (Ginsberg concurrence).
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and other communications revealing the intent behind every decision
made. 89
¶32
Second, the fate of self-proclaimed well-intentioned programmers
and distributors is left unknown. Several programmers are currently
developing systems that will make it easier to share digital information
anonymously and avoid detection by third parties. 90 For example, some
programmers insist that their objective is to create software to benefit
society by circumventing censorship and political repression, rather than
aiding in copyright infringement. 91 Will the inducement theory of liability
leave anyone who posits a lawful goal for their service and who does not
encourage infringement free from liability? Certainly not, as constructive
knowledge may still be imputed. Yet, unfortunately the standard for
imputing constructive knowledge is not certain. If a network is created to
and does facilitate the lawful exchange of files, yet it also enables copyright
infringement, does liability rest on how probable the legal uses are or just
that they could occur?

Congress’ rejection of the Induce Act, 92 which would have
criminalized distribution of products that enabled infringement, falls in line
with the Betamax rule that some level of constructive or actual knowledge
of the distributor is required. 93 At the other extreme, Grokster imposes
liability when knowledge and intent to encourage infringement is shown.
Yet, it is likely that future defendants may not possess such obvious intent
to induce infringement, and the standard for when to impute constructive
knowledge remains unclear and will be the subject of ongoing debate.

¶33

89

Jason Krause, Grokster Ruling Means Change Supporters Must Rethink Use
of File-Sharing Programs, 4 NO. 26 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 5 (July 1, 2005).
(suggesting that the large amount of time the Supreme Court spent analyzing
evidence of internal emails will cause the discovery in copyright litigation to
more closely resemble the discovery in securities litigation that examines
millions of emails).
90
John Markoff, File Sharers Anonymous: Building a Net That’s Private, N.Y.
TIMES, August 1, 2005, at C1.
91
Id. (claiming the classic use is for political opponents in China or even the
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C. Proposed Solution
As Grokster confirms, 94 and as the Seventh Circuit found, the
proportion of noninfringing uses must be part of the analysis, otherwise
there would be no redress against networks created to facilitate legitimate
exchanges, but that were dominated by illegal file swapping. Sanctioning
the existence of networks with a majority of illegal files would not only
allow them to compete with and make the proliferation of legitimate
networks more difficult, but would send the message to users that copyright
infringement is acceptable, and even desirable. Such a result could not
possibly be the better choice for the public good.

¶34

¶35
All distributors could be required to take reasonable care to regulate
and prevent illegal file sharing on their networks or face liability, similar to
the approach Judge Posner suggested in the Seventh Circuit. 95 Yet, for nonprofit programmers seeking to encourage free speech and the sharing of
information and ideas, the costs of regulating the networks may be too great
to sustain their existence. In this case, regulated profit seeking networks
may replace non-profit networks.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Grokster corrects the Ninth
Circuit’s misunderstanding of the Betamax rule by introducing the
inducement theory of secondary copyright liability that holds those actively
encouraging infringement liable. However, the failure to clarify the
standard for holding liable those defendants lacking an obvious intention to
facilitate infringement leaves uninformed those actors who need notice of
the law to determine whether to distribute innovations. Until the standard is
clarified by Congress or the Supreme Court, the tension between artists and
innovators remains unresolved. It is argued that too strict a rule will stifle
innovation, but as Gresham’s law 96 supports, perhaps a rule crafted by
Congress that only applies to peer-to-peer networks and eliminates
unregulated networks will not inhibit society’s access to information, but
simply increase the number of legitimate regulated networks available.
¶36
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